SENSITIVE

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 788627



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 27 June 1970


NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only


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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968-1970 Weekly average for each month




MARCH - JUNE 1970 Weekly data as reported





jumped sharply to 107 from last week's 80.







dropped slightly to 191 from last week's 205. This marks the fourth week of declining losses for RVN forces. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.







increased as one battalion sized group was noted. The number of infiltrators since 23 October 1969 is some 60,500-62,000.







declined to 556 from the 669 of last week.





decreased from last week's 2,093 to 1,474, reflecting the light military activity both in the Cambodian cross-border operations and within SVN.





as measured by the percentages of enemy killed by RVN forces slumped slightly to 63% from last week's 67.5%.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Act Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100030013-7

Enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam continued to be light, enemy casualties dropped significantly, and ARVN losses reached their lowest mark in over four months. Both the U.S. troop withdrawals from Cambodia and the Vietnamese 28 June elections were conducted with little enemy disruption. Continued movement of Communist units near the DMZ, however, increases the likelihood of a higher 1 yel of activity in northern I Corps in the near future.

Military activity in north Laos has been light and the Chinese road crews seem to have halted new construction for the season. In Xieng Khouang Province, friendly forces are still holding the key hills between their Long Tieng - Sam Thong - Tha Tam Bleung base area and enemy forces on the Plain of Jars. In the south, the Communists have not yet activated the new lines of communication which their capture of Saravane and Attopeu opened up, perhaps because government irregulars are still contesting control of the Bolovens Plateau. There are indications, however, that a river craft fleet is being assembled to carry supplies down the Se Kong to Attopeu. If Lao government forces can recapture their paramilitary bases on the rim of the Bolovens, the rim of the Plateau.

In Cambodia, the Communists continue to strike at widely scattered points. The Communists apparently intend to harass and confuse government defenders as well as sever vital lines of communication. The recent movement of the 275th Viet Cong Regiment into the Siem Reap area suggests that a renewal of fighting for that town may be in the offing. In the northeast, military defenders and civilian population of Labansiek and Bokheo were evacuated by ARVN and taken to South Vietnam. This ends Cambodian government presence in the northeast and will allow to receive men and supplies from North Vietnam via the logistical/signed to the loss of the northwest portion of the country, a withdrawal effort around Phnom Penh.

Enemy Infiltration

One four-digit infiltration group, with an estimated strength of 570, was observed during the week as the low level of personnel infiltration continued. The total number of infiltrators since 23 October 1969 is now estimated at some 60,500 - 62,000.

South Vietnam Developments

25X1X6

25X1X6

In a major address to the nation this week, President Thieu made it clear that he intends to pursue a cautious military policy in 25X1X6 Cambodia in order not to weaken South Vietnam's military posture at home. He stated that the main burden of Cambodia's defense must rest with the Cambodians and that outside assistance must be provided by "the whole to facilitate the repatriation of Vietnamese, prevent the rebuilding of forces on a spot basis when requested.

Thieu intends to concentrate GVN forces in the border to threatened key areas and then quickly withdrawn.

a member of the JGS also has stated that ARVN does not has been made that under no circumstances would Phnom Penh be allowed 25X1X7 in its defense.

25X1X7

Communist Developments

A recently captured enemy indoctrination guide, possibly based on Lao Dong Party Resolution 18, indicates that the Vietnamese Communist leadership maintained a very sober view of the war in Vietnam this spring after Sihanouk's ouster in Cambodia. The document acknowledges that the Allied pacification and Vietnamization programs have made

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considerable progress in the past year, and it admits that the Allies may still be in a strong position after U.S. forces are drawn down below 300,000 troops next year. While insisting that long-term trends favor an eventual Communist victory, the document leaves the impression that the leadership sees the war dragging on inconclusively for a long time and wants the rank and file to be psychologically prepared. Meanwhile, Calling its ampassadors, probably to k ef them on the new decisions on war strategy taken after Sihanouk's reval. Speeches given at the special session of the National Assembly in June, which probably reflected the results of a recent major policy review, emphasized the need for greater sacrifices and the prospects for hard fighting ahead.

25X1D

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